The effects of stimulus complexity and conceptual fluency on aesthetic judgments of abstract art: Evidence for a default-interventionist account by Ball, Linden et al.
Article
The effects of stimulus complexity and conceptual 
fluency on aesthetic judgments of abstract art: 
Evidence for a default­interventionist account
Ball, Linden, Threadgold, Emma, Marsh, John Everett and 
Christensen, Bo T
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/21975/
Ball, Linden ORCID: 0000­0002­5099­0124, Threadgold, Emma ORCID: 0000­0002­9073­0669, 
Marsh, John Everett ORCID: 0000­0002­9494­1287 and Christensen, Bo T (2018) The effects of 
stimulus complexity and conceptual fluency on aesthetic judgments of abstract art: Evidence for a  
default­interventionist account. Metaphor and Symbol, 33 (3). pp. 235­252. ISSN 1092­6488  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2018.1481255
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
- 1 - 
 
This is the final manuscript version of an article that has been accepted for publication 
in Metaphor and Symbol. The published version of record may differ from this 
manuscript. 
 
 
The Effects of Stimulus Complexity and Conceptual Fluency on Aesthetic Judgments of 
Abstract Art: Evidence for a Default–Interventionist Account 
 
Linden J. Ball1, Emma Threadgold1, John E. Marsh1,2,  
and 
Bo T. Christensen3 
 
1School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK 
2Department of Building, Energy & Environmental Engineering, University of Gävle, Gävle, 
Sweden 
3Department of Marketing, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
Running Head: AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS OF ABSTRACT ART 
 
*Corresponding Author:  
Linden J. Ball 
School of Psychology 
University of Central Lancashire 
Preston, PR1 2HE, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)1772 893421 
Email: LBall@uclan.ac.uk 
- 2 - 
 
Abstract 
We report an experiment investigating how stimulus complexity and conceptual fluency (i.e., 
the ease of deriving meaning) influence aesthetic liking judgments for abstract artworks. We 
presented participants with paintings at two levels of complexity (high vs. low) and five 
levels of conceptual fluency (determined from a prior norming study) and requested separate 
ratings of beauty and creativity. Our predictions were derived from the PIA Model (Pleasure-
Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking by Graf & Landwehr, 2015), which views aesthetic 
preferences as being formed by two, distinct fluency-based processes: an initial, automatic, 
stimulus-driven, default process and a subsequent, perceiver-driven deliberative process. A 
key trigger for deliberative processing is assumed to be disfluency at the default stage, as 
caused by factors such as visual complexity. We predicted that complexity and conceptual 
fluency would interact in determining aesthetic liking, with people preferring complex 
stimuli, but only when these are relatively easy to process conceptually. Our results supported 
this prediction for beauty judgments, although creativity judgments showed a curiously 
uniform profile. Nevertheless, the predictive capacity of the PIA Model in relation to beauty 
judgments attests to the explanatory strength of this default–interventionist theory of aesthetic 
liking. We conclude by noting important parallels between the PIA Model and the Revised 
Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017), which likewise has broad reach in 
explaining how defaultness and non-defaultness affect pleasure across a range of linguistic 
and pictorial stimuli. 
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The Effects of Stimulus Complexity and Conceptual Fluency on Aesthetic Judgments of 
Abstract Art: Evidence for a Default–Interventionist Account 
The study of aesthetics and its causal determinants is one of the oldest disciplines of 
experimental psychology, deriving from the foundational research of Fechner (1876), who 
aimed to draw links between the objective properties of stimuli and people’s aesthetic 
responses such as their judgments of beauty. This theme was taken up in earnest in the 20th 
century by Berlyne (e.g., 1971, 1974), who focused on the underlying physiological 
mechanisms mediating between objective stimulus properties and aesthetic responses, with 
an emphasis on arousal states. More recently, Berlyne’s insights and empirical findings have 
been refined as part of the contemporary “processing-fluency approach” to explaining 
aesthetic pleasure (for a review see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004a), which claims 
that people’s aesthetic judgments are closely aligned with the subjective ease with which 
mental operations are performed when perceiving an object.  
Reber et al.’s (e.g., 2004a) processing-fluency theory has had a major bearing on the 
study of aesthetics and likewise has much relevance to the experiment we report here, which 
was concerned with the relation between processing fluency and aesthetic liking in the 
context of aesthetic judgments about abstract artworks. In motivating our study, we were 
keen to focus on a fluency factor, that of conceptual fluency, which has received relatively 
little attention in the literature on empirical aesthetics. Conceptual fluency is associated with 
the ease of deriving meaning from stimuli (Whittlesea, 1993; Topolinski & Strack, 2009). 
Our interest in this factor contrasts with most extant research on aesthetics, which has instead 
focused on fluency experiences arising from the perceptual properties of stimuli (e.g., their 
symmetry). Such perceptual factors give rise to so-called perceptual fluency effects on 
aesthetic preferences, which we discuss more fully below. Some research has also examined 
retrieval fluency (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998), which is the ease with which 
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previously encountered stimuli can be brought to mind, with repeated prior exposure being 
one well-established variable known to make stimuli easier to retrieve and process (Zajonc, 
1968). We contend, however, that the fluent extraction of conceptual meaning from stimuli – 
especially in the context of abstract art appreciation – should be at least as important to 
judgments of aesthetic preference as more basic perceptual fluency effects. 
Our study also manipulated a second factor that was orthogonal to conceptual fluency, 
that of stimulus complexity, since this factor is of increasing interest to researchers attempting 
to understand the basis of aesthetic judgments (e.g., see Landwehr, Labroo, & Herrmann, 
2011) and may be especially pertinent in the context of appreciating abstract artworks, which 
seem to range widely in their perceived complexity. We additionally note that in directing our 
research at the issue of how conceptual fluency and stimulus complexity impact aesthetic 
judgments, we wished to examine how these factors might influence two specific types of 
aesthetic preference, that is, judgments of beauty and judgments of creativity. Although there 
is a large literature on how fluency is related to beauty judgments, there is limited research on 
how fluency impacts upon creativity judgments, despite creativity seeming to be a similarly 
important aesthetic dimension when evaluating artworks. 
Before presenting more details of our study and the theoretical ideas driving our 
predictions, it is important to mention that a new conceptual approach has recently been 
posited that both challenges and extends Reber et al.’s (e.g., 2004a) dominant processing 
fluency approach to aesthetic preference. This new approach, advanced by Graf and 
Landwehr (2015), presents a dual-process perspective on issues relating to fluency-based 
aesthetics in an effort to reconcile inconsistent findings in the literature regarding aesthetic 
preference patterns. Graf and Landwehr’s theory proposes that aesthetic preferences can be 
formed as a result of two, distinct fluency-based processes that are organised sequentially, 
that is: (i) an immediate, default, stimulus-driven process that occurs upon encountering an 
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aesthetic object, which gives rise to initial aesthetic judgments of pleasure or displeasure; and 
(ii) a subsequent, perceiver-driven, deliberative process arising from a person’s motivation to 
process a stimulus further, which engenders fluency-based aesthetic evaluations of interest, 
boredom or confusion. As we explain below, we find aspects of Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) 
dual-process theory to be very compelling in the context of predicting people’s aesthetic 
judgments about abstract artworks under manipulations of conceptual fluency and 
complexity, not least because the theory seems to be able to capture the interplay between 
initial, stimulus-driven judgments and perceiver-driven override of such default evaluations.   
The Processing-Fluency Account of Aesthetic Liking 
As we have noted, the dominant contemporary approach to understanding the 
mechanisms underlying aesthetic preference is Reber et al.’s (e.g., 2004a) processing-fluency 
account, which involves three foundational assumptions (see Graf & Landwehr, 2015). First, 
dependent upon an object’s perceptual properties and a perceiver’s prior processing 
experience with the object, the processing of the object will be experienced as more or less 
fluent. Second, the experience of fluent processing feels subjectively good at an affective 
level. Third, if this positive affect is not attributable to a different source, then it directly 
drives the aesthetic evaluation of the object, leading to a strong fluency–liking link whereby 
perceivers demonstrate a greater aesthetic preference for objects that are fluently processed 
compared to those that are disfluently processed (Reber et al., 2004a; Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006).  
In support of this predicted fluency–liking link is abundant evidence that objective 
stimulus properties that facilitate fluent processing (e.g., symmetry, visual clarity, figure-
ground contrast, exposure duration and curvature of contours) also increase aesthetic liking 
(e.g., Bar & Neta, 2006; Bertamini, Makin, & Rampone, 2013; Humphrey, 1997; 
Oppenheimer & Frank, 2008; Reber, 2002; Reber et al., 1998; Reber, Wurtz, & 
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Zimmermann, 2004b; Wurtz, Reber, & Zimmermann, 2008). Likewise, factors that are linked 
to a perceiver’s prior history with a stimulus can increase processing fluency during either 
retrieval or recognition and correspondingly increase aesthetic liking, with key factors being 
repeated exposure (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994) and perceptual 
priming (e.g., Reber et al., 1998).  
As has been pointed out recently by Graf and Landwehr (2015), however, despite the 
broad-ranging evidence for a fluency–liking link, there has been a growing body of findings 
that challenge the assumptions of the processing-fluency approach to aesthetic preference, 
and particularly its emphasis on the notion that aesthetic judgments arise primarily as a 
function of an object’s perceptual properties and a perceiver’s prior processing experience 
with the object. Graf and Landwehr note two main sources of evidence that challenge the 
fluency-based account. First, several studies have revealed the existence of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between processing fluency and aesthetic preference (e.g., Berlyne, 1970; 
Hekkert, Snelders, & van Wieringen, 2003; Landwehr et al., 2013). This evidence clearly 
runs counter to the assumption that there should be a monotonically increasing relationship 
between processing fluency and aesthetic liking. Second, some studies have observed a 
positive effect of novelty on aesthetic liking (e.g., Blijlevens, Carbon, Mugge, & Schoormans, 
2012; Giora, Fein, Kotler, & Shuval, 2015; Giora, Fein, Kronrod, Elnatan, Shuval, & Zur, 
2004; Giora, Givoni, Heruti, and Fein, 2017; Hekkert et al., 2003) as well as a positive effect 
of visual complexity (e.g., Landwehr et al., 2011; Martindale, Moore, & Borkum, 1990). 
From the perspective of the processing-fluency framework, it would be expected that novelty 
and complexity should decrease processing fluency and thereby decrease aesthetic liking. 
This inverse complexity effect is particularly fascinating and further underscores why we 
deemed it valuable in the present study to explore complexity as a factor that might be 
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associated with aesthetic judgments of abstract artworks, which are notorious for often being 
complex in nature.  
The Dual-Process Approach to Aesthetic Liking 
Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) dual-process approach to understanding fluency-based 
aesthetics has arisen as a direct response to increasing evidence of the kind just highlighted, 
which is difficult to explain according to a standard processing-fluency account. In 
developing their framework, Graf and Landwehr are particularly persuaded by theorists who 
argue that a perceiver’s active cognitive elaboration of a stimulus can play a key role in 
aesthetic liking (e.g., Armstrong & Detweiler-Bedell, 2008; Carbon & Leder, 2005; Muth & 
Carbon, 2013; Muth, Pepperell, & Carbon, 2013). In other words, a perceiver is proposed not 
always merely to react passively to a stimulus, but is also assumed to have the potential to 
engage actively with a stimulus, such as arises when they devote additional processing 
toward gaining a deeper interpretation and understanding of it.  
There is, indeed, some good empirical evidence that supports the importance of active 
cognitive elaboration in contributing to aesthetic liking. For example, studies using paintings 
as stimuli that have manipulated the presence of titles (e.g., Leder, Carbon, & Ripsas, 2006; 
Millis, 2001) and/or accompanying descriptive or stylistic information (e.g., Belke, Leder, & 
Augustin, 2006; Russell, 2003), have revealed that the aesthetic appreciation of such artworks 
can be enhanced through elaborative processing – provided that such elaboration is 
associated with a meaningful analysis of the stimulus. Likewise, active processing that is 
cued by instructing participants to evaluate stimuli on several dimensions can positively 
influence their appreciation of product designs (e.g., car exteriors), but only when such 
designs are novel, innovative or atypical (Carbon, Faerber, Gerger, Forster, & Leder, 2013; 
Carbon & Leder, 2005; Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & Carbon, 2010; Landwehr et al., 2013). 
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Graf and Landwehr (2015) propose that this latter research provides compelling 
evidence that there can be a positive relationship between elaborative processing and 
aesthetic liking in situations where the stimulus holds an “appropriate elaboration 
affordance”, which often arises when initial disfluent processing has occurred. Moreover, 
they propose that inconsistencies in the literature on empirical aesthetics relating to the 
observed association between processing fluency and liking can be directly attributed to the 
failure of the standard processing-fluency account to embrace fully the possibility that 
perceivers can take an active role in processing an initially disfluent stimulus so as to 
overturn early feelings of disliking and replace them with feelings of liking. The way in 
which meaningful elaborative processing can potentially modulate initial processing 
disfluency so as to enhance positive, aesthetic judgments formed a key driver for our study. 
In an attempt to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework that can explain 
apparent empirical contradictions arising from studies of aesthetic judgments, Graf and 
Landwehr (2015) advance their “Pleasure Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking” (PIA Model) 
as a form of default–interventionist dual-process theory (cf. Evans, 2017; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Kahneman, 2011). The PIA Model is centrally concerned with capturing the idea that 
aesthetic preferences can be formed as a result of two, qualitatively different and sequentially 
organised processes. More specifically, aesthetic liking deriving from the first process is 
based on stimulus-driven cognitive operations that occur mandatorily upon encountering an 
aesthetic object and which preclude deeper elaboration because of their unintended and 
automatic nature. In essence this first process provides a default aesthetic response of initial 
pleasure or displeasure. In contrast, aesthetic liking, arising from the second process, reflects 
an interaction between the stimulus-based output and perceiver-driven elaboration that can 
give rise to a more reflective and deliberative aesthetic evaluation that may be positively or 
negatively valenced. Graf and Landwehr conceptualise this second process as involving 
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“higher-order” cognitive operations such as careful and deliberate stimulus analysis as well 
as meaning assignment and interpretation.  
We note the close alignment between Graf and Landwehr’s default–interventionist 
dual-process theory of aesthetic liking and recent research on “meta-reasoning” in the 
literature on judgment, decision-making and reasoning (e.g., Ackerman & Thompson, 2017a, 
2017b). Such meta-reasoning research likewise adopts a dual-process stance on human 
thinking, emphasising how metacognitive monitoring is based on a variety of cues, including 
ones that derive from the perceivable features of the task (e.g., its apparent complexity) as 
well as from one’s own experience of attempting the task (e.g., subjective ease of 
processing). Ackerman and Thompson’s (2017a, 2017b) “meta-reasoning framework” – like 
Graf and Landwehr’s PIA Model – similarly entertains the possibility that initial disfluent 
processing in reasoning contexts may trigger more deliberative, analytic processing (see 
Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Thompson et al., 2013a, 2013b; but see also Ball, 
Threadgold, Solowiej, & Marsh, in press; Meyer et al., 2015). As such, Graf and Landwehr’s 
(2015) PIA Model complements major developments in the fields of judgment, decision-
making and reasoning, which we would argue here is a factor that adds to its credibility.  
That said, there are many important theoretical ideas and subtle distinctions that 
underpin Graf and Landwehr’s theorising (see also Graf & Landwehr, 2017), which also 
render it somewhat distinct from other default–interventionist theories as well as the meta-
reasoning framework. Although we do not wish to get sidetracked either into reviewing the 
full model or examining recent debates regarding its potential limitations (e.g., Consoli, 
2017), we nevertheless wish to emphasise three key assumptions of the model that relate 
closely to the factors that we manipulated in the study we report below. We therefore 
rehearse these assumptions here in order to show how they directly informed our predictions.  
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The first assumption to mention is that although Graf and Landwehr acknowledge that 
initial, default processing and subsequent, deliberative processing can both be potentially 
influenced either by perceptual fluency or by conceptual fluency, they nevertheless propose 
that default processing is relatively more influenced by perceptual fluency and that 
deliberative processing is relatively more influenced by conceptual fluency. This is because 
perceptual fluency is a largely passive, stimulus-driven experience, whereas conceptual 
fluency is a largely active, perceiver-driven process that places a heavy burden on elaborative 
and interpretative processes. In the context of our study, this first assumption implies: (i) that 
complexity (i.e., a stimulus-based property) will primarily have an impact at the default 
processing stage, with higher complexity promoting an increased sense of disfluency; and (ii) 
that conceptual fluency (arising from the ease of meaning extraction and stimulus 
interpretation) will primarily have an impact at the deliberative processing stage.  
The second assumption of the PIA Model to note is that the cue to move from default 
processing to deliberative processing is considered to be jointly determined by an interplay 
between two factors: (i) a feeling of disfluency, which signals to the perceiver the need to 
invest more effort in processing the stimulus; and (ii) the perceiver’s need for cognitive 
enrichment. Thus, for example, if a person experiences disfluency during default processing 
and has a high need for cognitive enrichment then the motivation to engage in deliberative 
processing will be especially strong. In cases where disfluency and need for cognitive 
enrichment are in opposition then it is the relative strength of these factors that determines 
whether deliberative processing is triggered. In our study we would expect that increasing 
levels of disfluency (arising from stimulus complexity) would be likely to trigger deliberative 
processing of presented stimuli even when balanced across individual differences in need for 
cognitive enrichment, which was not measured as part of our procedure. 
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The third assumption of the PIA Model that is of direct relevance to our study 
concerns the way in which deliberative processing can lead to aesthetic evaluations. What is 
initially perceived to be a disfluent stimulus through default processing may subsequently be 
found to be relatively easy to integrate into existing knowledge structures when processed 
deliberatively. The updated fluency level that is experienced after deliberative processing can 
thereby lead to a final aesthetic evaluation that is markedly different to the initial aesthetic 
evaluation that arose from default processing. Indeed, of particular applicability to our study 
is this very case where initial perceptions of disfluency arising from stimulus complexity give 
rise to deliberative processing that is considered to be less difficult than expected because of 
the relative ease of extracting meaning from the stimulus as a consequence of its high 
conceptual fluency. In this situation the conceptually fluent deliberative processing that arises 
should, according to Graf and Landwehr, result in a positive aesthetic judgment of liking for 
what was initially a relatively disfluent stimulus.    
Predictions 
In relation to the present study, which simultaneously manipulated the complexity 
(high vs. low) of presented abstract artworks and their conceptual fluency (across five 
linearly increasing levels), the aforementioned assumptions of the PIA Model give rise to two 
essential predictions. The first is that there should be a main effect of conceptual fluency on 
aesthetic liking such that conceptually fluent artworks will be liked to a greater degree than 
conceptually disfluent artworks. This prediction reflects the assumption that being more 
readily able to derive a meaningful interpretation of an abstract artwork at either the default 
processing stage or the deliberative processing stage should be a relatively pleasurable 
experience, especially if in general terms perceivers approach abstract artworks with an initial 
presupposition that they will be relatively difficult to process meaningfully. 
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The second prediction is that the main effect of conceptual fluency on aesthetic liking 
should be modulated by stimulus complexity, giving rise to a conceptual fluency by 
complexity interaction. This interaction is a consequence of the PIA Model’s assumption that 
it is complex stimuli (i.e., those that are relatively disfluent at the default processing level) 
that will trigger more deliberative processing and effort-after-meaning rather than simple 
stimuli (i.e., those that are relatively fluent at the default processing level). The result of 
complex stimuli being subjected to such deliberative processing is that they will be associated 
with increased aesthetic liking compared to simpler stimuli, with this increased liking being 
especially marked for stimuli that are also more conceptually fluent. In other words, people 
should tend to like best of all the abstract artworks in our study that initially seem to be 
complex but which turn out to be relatively easy to derive meaning from. In contrast, abstract 
artworks that initially seem to be complex and which then remain hard to derive meaning 
from will persist in being fairly unappealing, much like their simpler counterparts.  
In formulating our predictions, we leave open the possibility of observing a main 
effect of stimulus complexity on aesthetic liking. We note that given the nature of the 
predicted interaction, it is entirely possible that stimulus complexity could emerge as a 
significant main effect in its own right if judgments of aesthetic liking show a large influence 
of complexity at the higher levels of conceptual fluency. That said, the critical aspect of our 
predictions is the expected interaction between conceptual fluency and stimulus complexity, 
since this interaction derives very specifically from the PIA Model. 
In terms of dependent measures, we examined two dimensions of aesthetic liking, that 
is, beauty and creativity. Although there is a fairly extensive literature on how fluency is 
related to judgments of beauty, there is contrastingly very little research on how fluency 
influences judgments of creativity. We also note that the PIA Model does not address 
creativity as a form of aesthetic liking, focusing instead on pleasure/displeasure and the 
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dimensions of interest, boredom and confusion. Perceived beauty and creativity, however, do 
seem to be subjective experiences that relate centrally to aesthetic appreciation such that they 
may well be impacted in similar ways by manipulations of stimulus complexity and 
conceptual fluency. That is, creativity evaluations could well track beauty judgments given 
that it is at least intuitively plausible that high creativity is also associated with both high 
stimulus complexity and high conceptual fluency. In other words, artworks, deemed to be 
creative, might be those that are complex yet meaningful, just as we predict (based on the 
PIA Model) would be the case for artworks that are deemed to be beautiful. In support of this 
position there is indeed some limited evidence that higher creativity judgments are associated 
with higher complexity ratings for consumer products (O’Quin & Besemer, 1989).  
Making any firm predictions concerning the impact of stimulus complexity and 
conceptual fluency on creativity judgments is, however, very risky given the general absence 
of data and theorising on these issues. We are also aware of the need for further caution given 
the existence of some factor-analytic evidence from the domain of art evaluation indicating 
that perceived beauty and creativity may, in fact, be dissociable constructs (e.g., see 
Hagtvedt, Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008; Kozbelt, 2004). In addition, there is further evidence 
indicating that creativity is associated with perceived novelty (Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & 
Neubauer, 2015; Runco & Charles, 1993; Zhou, Wang, Song, & Wu, 2017), such that it 
seems plausible that for an abstract artwork to be judged as creative it would need to be 
surprising, lacking prototypicality and familiarity, which are all factors that are closely 
aligned with conceptual disfluency. As such, it is entirely possible that creativity and beauty 
judgments could show opposite associations with manipulated levels of conceptual fluency 
such that it is important to remain open to the possibility.  
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Preliminary Norming Study 
To create a suitable set of standardised materials for use in our main experiment, we 
first conducted a norming study that involved a large set of freely-available abstract artworks. 
For each of these artworks we obtained complexity and conceptual fluency ratings from a 
group of participants to enable us to implement effective experimental manipulations of these 
two factors in our main study. We report the full methodological details of this norming study 
below and note here that it allowed us to extract 30 artworks in total that could be separated 
across five different levels of conceptual fluency, with six artworks per level, three of which 
had been rated as “high complexity” and three of which had been rated as “low complexity”. 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-nine adults (49 females) participated in the norming experiment 
(Mage = 33 years, SDage =11.69 years, Rangeage = 18 to 67 years). The participants were 
volunteers recruited via an opportunity sample. No exclusion criteria were imposed that 
restricted participation in the study. In addition, screening of the resulting data provided no 
grounds for post-study participant exclusion (e.g., on the basis of speeded responding or 
limited response variability, which might be indicative of disengaged task completion). We 
acknowledge the gender imbalance in the sample for this norming study. That said, we have 
found no evidence in the literature to suggest that gender has a significant impact on 
judgments of conceptual fluency or complexity for artwork. The experiment received full 
ethical clearance from the Psychology and Social Science Ethics Board at the University of 
Central Lancashire, UK. 
Materials. A set of 150 images of abstract paintings were obtained through an internet 
search using “Google Images”, with these artworks covering a wide breadth of 
meaningfulness and complexity. The pieces of higher meaningfulness primarily depicted 
stylised and abstracted versions of animals, birds, landscapes and people, whereas those of 
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lower meaningfulness primarily involved patterns, shapes, amorphous structures and 
ambiguous forms. All of the selected images had been produced by lesser-known artists and 
were therefore deemed to be unfamiliar. This was important in order to avoid confounding 
effects of stimulus familiarity given the link that has been established in the literature 
between perceived familiarity and perceived beauty (e.g., Zajonc, 1968). We accept, 
however, that there is a very small chance that a participant might have previously 
encountered one of our chosen items, or, indeed, might have felt that an item was familiar 
because of its perceived similarity to a known piece of artwork. In the absence of 
participants’ familiarity judgments for the presented artworks, we therefore need to note a 
degree of caution when it comes to interpreting findings. 
Design. To obtain complexity and conceptual fluency ratings for each piece of 
artwork, we used a between-participants design, with 30 participants rating the artworks for 
conceptual fluency and 29 participants rating them for complexity. We opted for a between-
participants design to avoid the possibility that rating an artwork on one dimension (e.g., 
conceptual fluency) might be used as a proxy for rating it on another dimension (e.g., 
complexity). Although potentially unlikely given the sheer number of artworks to be rated, 
this was nevertheless a concern since we wished to obtain uncontaminated ratings for each 
dimension.  
Procedure. The experiment was conducted using “SurveyGizmo”, an online 
questionnaire platform. Each participant read an information sheet and responded to a 
question indicating their consent to proceed with the experiment. They were informed that 
withdrawal was not possible once they had submitted their responses, but that they could 
withdraw at any point prior to this by simply closing their browser. All incomplete 
questionnaire responses were deleted prior to analysis. The presentation of the 150 artwork 
pieces was independently randomised for each participant. Each artwork was presented with 
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a rating scale for the participant to register either a conceptual fluency judgment or a 
complexity judgment, dependent on the condition that they were in.  
For conceptual fluency ratings participants were asked “How meaningful is this 
picture to you?” and for complexity ratings they were asked “How complex is this picture to 
you?”. They registered their responses on a sliding scale that ranged from 1 to 100. The scale 
end-points had descriptors (i.e., “not at all meaningful” vs. “very meaningful” for the 
conceptual fluency scale; “not at all complex” vs. “very complex” for the complexity scale). 
These end-point descriptors were reversed for approximately half of the participants in each 
condition to counteract any spatial biases that might impact ratings. The starting point of the 
slider was always set at the scale midpoint (i.e., 50).  
Participants were additionally provided with the following instructions when asked 
for meaningfulness ratings in the conceptual fluency condition: “Meaningfulness is your own 
personal opinion of how meaningful a picture is to you. There is no right or wrong answer”. 
Likewise, when asked for complexity ratings participants were instructed as follows: 
“Complexity is your own personal opinion of how complex a picture is to you. There is no 
right or wrong answer”.   
The instructions relating to meaningfulness and complexity were deliberately kept 
simple. We appreciate that the terms “complexity” and “meaningfulness” are open to 
individual interpretation, but we also note that previous research indicates that the standard 
custom and practice when eliciting ratings for these concepts is to leave them undefined, 
instead relying on people’s everyday understanding (e.g., see Lindauer & Dintruff, 1975; 
Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980; Turner & Silvia, 2006). In support of this approach Russell 
and Milne (1997) argue that when studying aesthetic liking it is important to avoid over-
defining what are familiar and well-understood concepts as this can lead to spurious findings 
that have limited relevance to people’s natural judgments. 
- 17 - 
 
Participants were not given a time restriction for providing a rating for each artwork 
piece. However, they were informed that the rating experiment should take approximately 30 
minutes to complete. Participants were debriefed at the end of the questionnaire and thanked 
for their time.  
Results 
For each piece of artwork, we computed mean and standard deviation values for its 
rated meaningfulness and complexity, reverse scoring the ratings on those scales for which 
we had inverted the end-points. In all cases the final mean values were such that higher 
scores reflected greater meaningfulness or greater complexity.  
For the purpose of the main experiment we note that the meaningfulness ratings for 
artworks served as a proxy for our conceptual fluency factor. We wanted to construct five 
linearly increasing levels of conceptual fluency, with six artworks at each consecutive level 
having a mean separation of around 10 points. We also wished to manipulate complexity at 
each level of conceptual fluency so as to have three relatively low complexity artworks that 
fell into the complexity range of 30 – 40, and three relatively high complexity artworks that 
fell into the complexity range of 50 – 60. We additionally wanted to ensure that the mean 
complexity of the high complexity items was broadly equivalent across all levels of 
conceptual fluency (and likewise for the low complexity items).  
From the original 150 normed items we were able to extract 30 artworks that closely 
fulfilled the aforementioned criteria in order to achieve a well-controlled set of materials for 
use in the main experiment (see Table 1 for the mean ratings of artworks at each level of 
conceptual fluency and complexity). The average meaningfulness rating for the original 150 
items was 46.44. As such, our middle category of conceptual fluency (40.00 – 49.99) 
encompassed the average score, with two categories below this middle category and two 
above it. We note that to obtain sufficient artworks at both the low and high complexity 
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levels we had to extend the desired ranges minimally (i.e., 27 – 40 rather than the planned 30 
– 40, and 46 – 62 rather than the planned 50 – 60).  
***Please insert Table 1 about here*** 
 
Table 1. Mean meaningfulness ratings and complexity ratings for artworks (with mean 
standard deviations; SDs) at each level of conceptual fluency and complexity. 
Conceptual  
Fluency  
Complexity  
Meaningfulness Rating Complexity Rating 
Mean SD Mean  SD 
< 29.99 High 27.6 22.1 58.1 20.0 
Low 25.5 20.5 33.6 20.2 
30.00 – 39.99 High 36.6 25.8 57.1 18.8 
 Low 36.3 21.5 37.3 20.4 
40.00 – 49.99 High 45.9 25.1 60.6 19.6 
 Low 45.1 27.3 35.7 19.7 
50.00 – 59.99 High 54.3 27.9 61.7 22.8 
 Low 53.9 25.9 34.8 17.1 
> 60.00 High 67.6 24.7 52.6 25.3 
 Low 62.5 23.6 34.4 19.0 
Notes: SD values for the three artwork items in each cell of the table represent averages that are calculated from 
the SDs obtained from the norming study. The set of 30 abstract artworks that were selected for the main 
experiment are accessible at http://dx.doi.org/10.17030/uclan.data.00000152. 
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Table 1 indicates a clear mean separation across conceptual fluency levels of around 
10 points on the rating scale, giving rise to five linearly increasing levels of artwork 
meaningfulness. We acknowledge that the mean standard deviation values at each level of 
conceptual fluency are quite high, which reflects the fact that there was a fair degree of 
individual variation in meaningfulness ratings arising for each piece of artwork during the 
norming study. Such individual variation is ratings at the item level is typical in studies 
examining people’s subjective experience of artworks and other aesthetic objects (e.g., 
Jacobsen, 2010; Jacobsen & Höfel, 2002) and means that overall trends across several levels 
of a factor are often more informative that pairwise comparisons between adjacent levels of a 
factor, which may not reveal significant differences. In the present study the use of five 
increasing levels of conceptual fluency encompassing artworks with meaningfulness ratings 
in the mid-20s at one end of the continuum and in the mid-60s at the other end of the 
continuum provided a fair degree of assurance that significant trends should be detectable if 
conceptual fluency is causally related to aesthetic judgments. 
For the complexity factor, Table 1 shows a mean separation between high and low 
complexity artworks of around 20 – 25 points, with the exception of the highly meaningful 
items, where it was only possible to achieve a mean separation in complexity of around 18 
points. We suggest that this is sufficiently close to what was achieved for the other levels of 
conceptual fluency as to be a limited concern for the integrity of the experiment that we 
report below.  
Main Experiment 
 To recapitulate the aim of our main experiment, we wished to examine the impact of 
the complexity and conceptual fluency of abstract artworks on people’s judgments of beauty 
and creativity. Drawing on the results of our artwork norming study, we were able to 
construct a highly controlled experiment that manipulated the complexity of artworks at two 
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levels and their conceptual fluency at five levels in order to detect any effects of these 
variables on aesthetic judgments.   
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-six adults (33 female) participated in the experiment (Mage = 34 
years, SDage = 9 years, Rangeage = 21 to 59 years). Participants were recruited via an 
opportunity sample using the online participation forum “Prolific Academic”. As with the 
norming study, no exclusion criteria were imposed that restricted participation in the main 
experiment. In addition, screening of the resulting data provided no grounds for post-
experiment participant exclusion. Participants were reimbursed £1.50 for 15 minutes of 
participation time. G-Power was used to calculate the a priori sample size required for a 0.15 
Cohen’s d (i.e., a small effect size) with 90% power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). This indicated a minimum recommended sample size of 63 participants. The 
experiment received full ethical clearance from the Psychology and Social Science Ethics 
Board at the University of Central Lancashire, UK. 
Design and Materials. We implemented 2 x 5 fully within-participants design using 
the materials extracted from the norming study reported above, with key properties of the 
materials as depicted in Table 1. The complexity factor had two levels (low complexity: 27 –
40; high complexity: 46 – 62) whilst the conceptual fluency factor had five levels that 
reflected increasing gradations in the rated meaningfulness of artworks (< 29.99; 30.00 – 
39.99; 40.00 – 49.99; 50.00 – 59.99; and > 60.00). Each combination of a level of conceptual 
fluency with a level of complexity encompassed three pieces of abstract artwork. Table 1 
presents details of the descriptive data associated with each of the 10 categories of artwork. 
The full set of 30 abstract artworks selected for use in this experiment are accessible at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17030/uclan.data.00000152. 
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Procedure. The experiment was run online using the SurveyGizmo platform. Each 
participant read an information sheet and responded to a question indicating consent to 
proceed with the experiment. The same withdrawal protocol was applied as in the norming 
study.  
 All participants rated each of the 30 pieces of presented artwork. There were six 
pieces at each level of conceptual fluency, with half of these being high in complexity and the 
other half being low in complexity. Participants rated each piece of artwork twice, once for 
beauty and once for creativity. The 30 ratings for beauty were blocked, as were the 30 ratings 
for creativity. The rating order for beauty and creativity was counterbalanced across 
participants (i.e., half of the participants conducted beauty ratings before creativity ratings 
and half had the opposite ordering). Furthermore, the presentation order of the 30 pieces of 
artwork was independently randomised by the survey program for each participant, both 
when they engaged in the beauty ratings and when they engaged in the creativity ratings. 
As in the norming study, each participant provided beauty and creativity ratings using 
a sliding pointer on a 100-point scale, with the pointer commencing at the mid-point. For 
beauty ratings participants were asked “How beautiful is this picture to you?”, with the scale 
end-point descriptors (i.e., “not at all beautiful” vs. ‘very beautiful”) reversed across half of 
the participants to ensure counterbalancing. For creativity ratings participants were asked 
“How creative is this picture to you?”, with the scale end-point descriptors (i.e., “not at all 
creative” vs. ‘very creative”), again reversed across half of the participants. In addition, 
participants were given the following instructions when asked for beauty [or creativity] 
ratings: “Beauty [Creativity] is your own personal opinion of how beautiful [creative] a 
picture is to you. There is no right or wrong answer”.  
Participants were not required to complete the experiment within a specific 
timeframe, however, they were informed that it should take approximately 15 minutes in 
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total. All participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment and thanked for their 
participation time.   
Results 
Descriptive data relating to both beauty and creativity ratings are shown in Table 2. 
An alpha level of .05 was adopted for all statistical tests unless specified otherwise in the 
text. A rating score of between 1 and 100 was obtained for each artwork piece in response to 
both the beauty and creativity questions. Consistent with the norming study, we reverse 
scored the ratings on those scales for which we had inverted the end-points. In all cases the 
final mean values were such that higher scores reflected greater beauty judgments or greater 
creativity judgments. We analyzed beauty and creativity ratings separately using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). 
***Please insert Table 2 about here*** 
Beauty. A 2 (complexity: high vs. low) by 5 (conceptual fluency: < 29.99; 30.00 – 
39.99; 40.00 – 49.99; 50.00 – 59.99; and > 60.00) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the mean beauty ratings. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for the conceptual fluency factor, χ2(9) = 61.34, p 
< .001, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was therefore applied to adjust the degrees of 
freedom for this factor accordingly.  
As predicted, the ANOVA revealed the presence of a significant main effect of 
conceptual fluency on beauty ratings, F(2.56, 166.45) = 36.45,  p < .001, ηp2= 0.36. The test 
of within-participants contrasts indicated the existence of a highly reliable linear trend in the 
data, F(1, 65) = 53.99, p < .001, ηp2= 0.45, whereby abstract artwork was judged to be 
increasingly more beautiful at increasing levels of conceptual fluency. In addition, there was 
also evidence for the presence of a quadratic trend in the data, F(1, 65) = 32.36, p < .001, 
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ηp2= 0.33, as suggested by the slight U-shaped pattern that is visible for beauty judgments in 
Figure 1 across levels of conceptual fluency. 
***Please insert Figure 1 about here*** 
 
Table 2. Mean beauty ratings and creativity ratings for artworks (with standard deviations; 
SDs) at each level of conceptual fluency and complexity. 
Conceptual  
Fluency  
Complexity  
Beauty Rating Creativity Rating 
Mean SD Mean  SD 
< 29.99 High 47.2 20.0 51.7 20.2 
Low 44.1 20.3 49.8 17.4 
30.00 – 39.99 High 39.6 20.1 49.5 18.4 
 Low 40.6 19.8 49.1 17.6 
40.00 – 49.99 High 54.9 15.0 50.5 23.0 
 Low 46.5 16.5 50.2 17.9 
50.00 – 59.99 High 57.9 18.9 51.2 23.6 
 Low 48.6 17.3 50.3 14.2 
> 60.00 High 70.2 13.8 51.5 21.0 
 Low 56.7 14.8 51.3 13.4 
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Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni adjustment applied for multiple comparisons 
indicated a significant difference between all levels of meaningfulness (all ps < .005), with 
the exception of the difference between < 29.99 versus 40.00 – 49.99 (p = .10), and the 
difference between 40.00 – 49.99 versus 50.00 – 59.99 (p = .99). The failure of the latter 
pairwise comparison to reveal a significant difference may reflect the issue that we 
mentioned previously, whereby the somewhat high average standard deviations in 
meaningfulness ratings for items at each level of conceptual fluency may obscure the 
emergence of significant differences between levels. The same issue may underpin the 
quadratic effect arising in the test of within-participants contrasts, which may have occurred 
because items at the lowest level of conceptual fluency potentially had degrees of 
meaningfulness that overlapped with items at higher levels of conceptual fluency for some 
participants. Notwithstanding these caveats, we suggest that the data broadly align very well 
with the existence of a predicted effect of conceptual fluency on beauty ratings.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean beauty ratings for artworks as a function of conceptual fluency and 
complexity. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Interestingly, the ANOVA also revealed the existence of a significant main effect of 
complexity on beauty ratings, F(1, 65) = 41.07,  p < .001, ηp2 = 0.39, with high complexity 
artworks (M = 53.96, SE = 1.50) being rated as significantly more beautiful than low 
complexity artworks (M = 47.28, SE = 1.39). Also as predicted, the effect of complexity 
modulated the effect of conceptual fluency, as revealed by a significant conceptual fluency 
by complexity interaction, F(4, 260) = 6.38,  p < .001, ηp2 = 0.09. To clarify the source of this 
interaction we conducted simple main effects analyses with Bonferroni corrections applied 
for multiple comparisons. These analyses revealed significant differences in mean beauty 
ratings between high versus low complexity artworks across the three highest levels of 
conceptual fluency, that is: 40.00 – 49.99, 50.00 – 59.99 and > 60.00 (all ps < .001). 
However, there was no significant difference in mean beauty ratings between high versus low 
complexity artworks at the two lowest levels of conceptual fluency, that is: < 29.99 (p = .19) 
and 30.00 – 39.99 (p = .68). In other words, complexity appeared to impact on beauty ratings 
for abstract artwork pieces only at a conceptual fluency levels approximating 40 or greater. 
Figure 1 clearly depicts this significant interaction between conceptual fluency and 
complexity.  
Creativity. A 2 (complexity: high vs. low) by 5 (conceptual fluency: < 29.99; 30.00 – 
39.99; 40.00 – 49.99; 50.00 – 59.99; and > 60.0) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted 
on the mean creativity ratings. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for conceptual fluency; χ2(9) = 94.34, p < .001, and for the 
conceptual fluency by complexity interaction χ2(9) = 24.45, p = .004. Therefore, a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to adjust the degrees of freedom in both 
instances.  
The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant main effect of complexity on 
creativity ratings, F(1, 65) = 0.15,  p = .70, ηp2 = .002. Mean creativity ratings for the high 
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complexity pictures (M = 50.87, SE = 1.94) were, in fact, nearly identical to those for the low 
complexity pictures (M = 50.11, SE = 1.30), with both of these mean values being located 
very close to the mid-point of the creativity rating scale (see Table 2). The ANOVA also 
indicated that there was no significant main effect of conceptual fluency on creativity ratings, 
F(2.28, 148.07) = 0.27,  p = .793, ηp2 = .004, with the ratings in Table 2 again indicating that 
all mean creativity scores were located close to the scale mid-point. Unsurprisingly, there was 
also no significant conceptual fluency by complexity interaction, F(3.26, 212.11) = 0.11, p = 
.963, ηp2 = .002. 
General Discussion 
The present study set out to examine how aesthetic liking judgments are influenced by 
two factors that have received limited attention in the literature on empirical aesthetics, that 
is, conceptual fluency (i.e., the ease of extracting a meaningful interpretation from a 
presented stimulus) and stimulus complexity. Our research was partly motivated by our 
intuition that these two factors would be likely to play an important role in the aesthetic 
appreciation of abstract art given that such art is frequently considered to be visually 
challenging whilst still often being viewed positively. It therefore seemed important to 
manipulate these two factors simultaneously in order to unpack the way in which they might 
contribute to the aesthetic liking of abstract artworks.  
Our research was not entirely driven by curiosity, however, but was also motivated by 
theoretical concerns relating to limitations that are becoming increasingly apparent with 
respect to the dominant theory of aesthetic liking, that is, Reber et al.’s (e.g., 2004a) 
processing-fluency account. This account places a key emphasis on how feelings of fluency 
that arise when processing a stimulus engender feelings of liking, with such processing 
fluency typically arising either from the visual properties of a stimulus (e.g., its symmetry, 
contrast or clarity; Reber, 2002; Reber et al., 2004b; Reber et al., 1998; Wurtz et al., 2008) or 
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from a perceiver’s previous processing experience with the stimulus (e.g., prior exposure to 
it; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994). Although this processing-fluency account has been able 
to explain a wide range of data from research on empirical aesthetics it has been subjected to 
increasing challenges in recent years. There is, for example, mounting evidence that runs 
counter to the prediction of a monotonically increasing relationship between processing 
fluency and aesthetic liking (e.g., Hekkert et al., 2003; Landwehr et al., 2013). There is also 
growing evidence that factors that seem to be linked to disfluency, such as complexity and 
novelty, may paradoxically engender aesthetic liking (e.g., Blijlevens et al., 2012; Landwehr 
et al., 2011; Martindale et al., 1990).  
Although attempts have been made to add auxiliary assumptions to the processing-
fluency account (e.g., Reber et al., 2004) in order to reconcile the theory with anomalous 
findings, there is growing unease with the viability of the account such that new theories are 
beginning to emerge aimed at providing a more comprehensive explanation of extant data 
whilst also fueling new predictions. One such account is Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) 
Pleasure Interest Model of Aesthetic Liking (PIA Model), which draws extensively on dual-
process notions such as those associated with default–interventionist theories of reasoning 
(e.g., Evans, 2017; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The PIA model emphasises how aesthetic 
liking can be driven by two processes: (i) an initial process that is automatic and stimulus-
driven, delivering default aesthetic judgments akin to those captured by the traditional 
processing-fluency model; and (ii) a second, deliberative process that is elaborative, 
interpretative and perceiver-driven in nature, delivering outputs that may overturn or 
reinforce default preferences. 
Importantly in terms to the predictions driving our research, the second process in the 
PIA Model is assumed often to be triggered by disfluency arising at the default processing 
stage – as might occur, for example, when a stimulus is complex. The triggering of the 
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deliberative stage will typically involve motivated processing aimed at deriving meaning, 
which will be facilitated if a stimulus is conceptually fluent despite its apparent complexity. 
If meaning extraction is relatively straightforward at this second stage, then this will 
engender enhanced aesthetic liking even in the face of apparent complexity, thereby 
potentially explaining the occurrence of some seemingly anomalous findings in the literature 
on art appreciation (e.g., Belke et al., 2006; Leder et al., 2006; Millis, 2001; Russell, 2003).  
The latter processing sequence that we have outlined aligns closely with the 
processing sequence that we expected to occur for the complex stimuli we devised for our 
reported study of aesthetic liking for abstract artworks. The study manipulated stimulus 
complexity (high vs. low) together with the conceptual fluency of the presented artworks, 
which were associated with five distinct levels of predetermined conceptual fluency. Our 
overarching prediction was that our aesthetic liking data would reveal the existence of an 
interaction between stimulus conceptual fluency and complexity given that high complexity 
stimuli should trigger more deliberative processing than low complexity stimuli, with such 
deliberative processing then engendering higher liking ratings at increasing levels of 
conceptual fluency. Our findings revealed the existence of this expected modulation of 
conceptual fluency by complexity in relation to aesthetic judgments of beauty, thereby 
attesting to the predictive strength of Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) PIA Model (see also Graf 
& Landwehr, 2017). Put simply, we predicted and found that people like more complex 
abstract artworks compared to simpler ones, but only when they can fairly readily derive 
meaning from these apparently complex stimuli. In cases where the extraction of meaning is 
more elusive, then people show reduced liking for abstract artworks and no separation in 
liking between complex versus simpler pieces. 
These latter findings, however, were only apparent in our measures of aesthetic liking 
in terms of beauty. When it came to measures of creativity our findings ran counter to 
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predictions and simply appeared to be uniform across all factors and levels, merely residing 
at the mid-point of the creativity scale. This null effect is both striking and curious, especially 
since the complexity and conceptual fluency factors were evidently having such an impact on 
beauty judgments. How, then, might we explain this lack of sensitivity of our creativity 
measure to our manipulations, with participants seemingly defaulting to a middle-ground 
evaluation of “moderately creative”? In attempting a post hoc account of this finding we first 
note that creativity judgments are viewed as being fundamentally concerned with perceptions 
of novelty and value (e.g., Mayer, 1999). Since all of our presented artworks had novelty (i.e., 
they were selected to be unfamiliar) they presumably would all have been weighted similarly 
by participants on this dimension, such that novelty would have had an essentially uniform 
impact on creativity judgments. In terms of value, however, the only function that our 
artworks served was an aesthetic one relating to their perceived beauty, which means that 
creativity judgments might well have been expected to closely track beauty judgments. The 
fact that this was not the case suggests creativity judgments might, after all, have tracked 
novelty – and done so to a similar degree across all pieces. In support of this speculative 
account of our creativity data is evidence that the perception of novelty appears to be the 
most important determinant of creativity (Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015; 
Runco & Charles, 1993) and that creativity and beauty also load on different factors in factor 
analytic studies of art appreciation (Hagtvedt, Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008; Kozbelt, 2004).  
The lack of any effect of complexity or conceptual fluency on creativity judgments in 
our study is fascinating and certainly worthy of further investigation in the context of art 
appreciation. Notwithstanding this null effect, however, we contend that the way in which 
Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) PIA Model was able to predict the findings for our beauty 
measure is impressive, not least because the interaction prediction was both risky and 
arguably non-intuitive in terms of complexity driving judgments of aesthetic liking. In this 
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respect, we concur with Graf and Landwehr (2015), who suggest that the PIA Model is 
eminently applicable to understanding the perception of artworks, where higher-order 
cognitive processes, such as finding meaning and understanding, seem to play such an 
important role in art appreciation (e.g., Leder et al., 2004, 2006). As Graf and Landwehr also 
note, the PIA Model further supports the idea that artists may actively use disfluency as a 
way to disrupt any tendency by a viewer to default to the shallow processing of a piece of art 
(cf. Bullot & Reber, 2013).  
Although our findings in relation to people’s beauty judgments appear to align well 
with the predictions of Graf and Landwehr’s (2015) PIA Model, we acknowledge some 
weaknesses with our study that would be worth addressing in future research in order to 
facilitate an even more definitive examination and replication of predicted effects. First and 
foremost, we reiterate the challenge of obtaining abstract artworks at distinct levels of 
conceptual fluency that overlap minimally in their perceived degree of meaningfulness with 
other levels of conceptual fluency. Individual differences in people’s ability to derive 
meaning from artworks will typically limit what can be achieved in terms of reducing the 
variance in conceptual fluency judgments at different levels of this factor. One way forward 
might be to constrain the definition of “meaningfulness” that is provided to participants prior 
to eliciting judgments from them. For example, it might be useful to elicit a more objective 
judgment of meaningfulness that reflects how much it is felt that “people in general” might 
derive meaning from a stimulus, although in this respect we note the cautionary comments of 
Russell and Milne (1997), who argue that when studying aesthetic liking it is important to 
avoid over-defining familiar and well-understood concepts.  
Second, it would be useful for future research to examine more extreme differences 
between stimuli in relation to the complexity factor. We concede that the manipulation of low 
versus high complexity in our study (i.e., ratings of 30 – 40 vs. 50 – 60) meant that stimuli 
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were closer to the midpoint of the complexity scale than might have been desirable. This 
issue again speaks to the challenges of developing effective materials for use in studies in the 
domain of empirical aesthetics. By testing an original set of 150 abstract artworks from 
across a wide range of styles we had hoped that our norming study would give rise to a better 
separation of low versus high complexity artworks for use in our main study. We were, 
however, also constrained by the need to identify three high-complexity and three low-
complexity items at each of the five levels of conceptual fluency, which meant that there 
were insufficient items across each meaningfulness level to choose more extreme complexity 
ratings. Nevertheless, we would argue that emergence in our study of a reliable interaction 
between complexity and conceptual fluency for beauty judgments supports the view that our 
complexity manipulation was effective despite not being as extreme as we would have liked. 
Third, we acknowledge that our study potentially suffered from the fact that the 
sample used in our norming study was not drawn from the same population as the sample in 
our main experiment, which derived from the Prolific Academic online survey platform. 
Nevertheless, no restrictions were set on participants selecting the study through Prolific 
Academic, such that the impact arising from the use of differing populations in our norming 
study and our main experiment may well have been minimized.  
As a final, positive consideration that is very much in the spirit of broadening the 
theoretical reach of Graf and Landwehr’s PIA Model of aesthetic liking, we would like to 
note the close parallels between the key assumptions of the PIA Model and those of the 
Revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis as advanced recently by Giora et al. (2017; for 
former, pioneering instantiations of this hypothesis see Giora et al., 2004, 2015). The Revised 
Optimal Innovation Hypothesis provides another highly compelling contemporary account of 
the role of default processing in affecting pleasure in relation to presented stimuli. According 
to the hypothesis, a stimulus would be optimally innovative if: (i) it involves a nondefault 
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response to a given stimulus, which differs from the default response(s) associated with it, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, while (ii) allowing for the automatic recoverability of 
the default response(s) related to that stimulus, so that both the default and nondefault 
responses may be weighed against each other, their similarity and differences assessable. 
When these aforementioned conditions prevail then the stimulus would be experienced 
affectively as being pleasurable.  
The parallels between the Revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis and the core 
assumptions of the PIA Model seem striking. Both accounts emphasise the inherent contrast 
between a default and a nondefault response as being crucial for the experience of aesthetic 
pleasure and both accounts hold that the default response needs to be available (recoverable) 
so that it can be considered in relation to the nondefault response so that similarities and 
differences can be ascertained. Indeed, Graf and Landwehr (2015) are at pains to point out 
that aesthetic liking judgments reflect a complex interplay between default processing and 
deliberative processing, with the perceiver being alert to ongoing fluctuations and contrasts in 
fluency/disfluency as well as the critical juxtaposition between default fluency/disfluency and 
fluency/disfluency arising at the deliberative stage.  
Although the mapping between the PIA Model and the Revised Optimal Innovation 
Hypothesis may not be perfect, there seems enough common ground to suggest fruitful lines 
of convergence in the future. This is an exciting prospect, not least because of the already 
wide explanatory reach of the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis, both in its current and its 
former versions. It has, for example, been applied extensively to predict and explain people’s 
understanding of figurative language (e.g., sarcasm), including the derivation of lexically 
coded meanings and non-coded, constructed interpretations (e.g., Giora et al., 2017; for 
further, related evidence see Filik, Howman, Ralph-Nearman, & Giora, 2018, this issue; 
Giora, Cholev, Fein, & Peleg, 2018, this issue). The Optimal Innovation Hypothesis has also 
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been applied successfully in predicting and explaining pleasure ratings with pictorial stimuli 
(e.g., Giora et al., 2004). The hypothesis can additionally capture the potential importance of 
cueing nondefaultness, so that nondefault meanings do not escape a comprehender’s attention 
(for further discussion of the need to signpost nondefaultness, see Veale, 2018, this issue; see 
also Giora, submitted). Such cueing of nondefault meanings appears to be relatively 
commonplace in artwork appreciation, where an artist’s use of a carefully-crafted title or 
subtle pointers within the artwork itself may serve to signal the presence of initially evasive, 
nondefault interpretations. Although our reported work did not tackle the signposting of 
nondefaultness, this topic is well worth examining further in the context of art appreciation. 
In sum, we welcome the possibility that future research might enable integration of key 
elements of the PIA Model and the Revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis in order further 
to clarify the role of default and nondefault processing in driving judgments of aesthetic 
liking across a wide range of stimuli. 
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